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Abstract
The paper is concerned with a two-player nonzero-sum differential game in the case
when players are informed about the current position. We consider the game in control
with guide strategies first proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin. The construction
of universal strategies is given both for the case of continuous and discontinuous
value functions. The existence of a discontinuous value function is established. The
continuous value function does not exist in the general case. In addition, we show the
example of smooth value function not being a solution of the system of Hamilton–
Jacobi equation.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study Nash equilibria for a two-player deterministic
differential game in the case when the players are informed about the present position. We
look for the universal equilibrium solution. The term ‘universal Nash equilibrium strategies’
means that the strategies provide the Nash equilibrium at any initial position. The notion
of universality generalizes the notion of time consistency, and it is appropriative for the case
when the players form their controls stepwise. Generally speaking, in this case the notion
of time consistence isn’t well-defined.
There are two approaches in the literature dealing with this problem (see [8], and the
references therein). The first approach is close to the so-called Folk Theorem for repeated
games, and is based on the punishment strategy technique. This technique makes it possible
to establish the existence of Nash equilibrium at the given initial position in the framework
of feedback strategies [14], [15] and in the framework of Friedman strategies [21]. The set of
Nash equilibria at the given initial position is characterized in [12], [14]. The infinitesimal
version of this characterization is derived in [2], [4]. In addition, each Nash equilibrium
payoff at the given position corresponds to the pair of continuous functions; these functions
are stable with respect to auxiliary zero-sum differential games, and their values at the initial
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position are kept along some trajectory [3]. Note, that in this case the Nash equilibrium
strategies are not universal and strongly time consistent.
The key idea of the second approach is to find a Nash equilibrium payoff as a solution
of the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations [5], [11], [13]. In this case the universal Nash
equilibrium can be constructed. In particular, they are strongly time consistent. However,
the existence theorem for the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations is established only for
some cases of the games in one dimension [6], [7], [10].
In this paper we consider the Nash equilibrium for deterministic differential games
in control with guide strategies. These strategies was first proposed by Krasovskii and
Subbotin for zero-sum differential games [17]. In the framework of this formalization the
player forms his control stepwise. It is assumed that the player measures the state of the
system only in the times of control correction. At the time of control correction the player
estimates the state of the system using on the information about the state of the system at
the previous time instants of control correction. Having this estimate and the information
about the real state of the system he assigns the control which is used up to the next control
correction.
The choice of control with guide strategies is motivated by the following arguments. The
universal optimal feedback doesn’t exist even for the case of zero-sum differential game [19].
The universal solution of zero-sum differential games can be find in the class of feedback
strategies depending on the precision parameter [16], or in the class of control with guide
strategies [17]. However, for the case of nonzero-sum differential games existing design
of Nash equilibria in the class feedback strategies depending on the precision parameter
doesn’t provide the universality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the problem, and introduce
the control with guide strategies. In Section 3 we construct the Nash equilibrium in the
control with guide strategies for the case of a continuous value function. This function is to
satisfy some viability conditions. Further in Section 3 the properties of a continuous value
function are considered. We give the infinitesimal form of viability conditions. After we
compare the value functions satisfying viability conditions and the solutions of the system
of Hamilton–Jacobi equations. The example showing that the continuous value function
does not exist in the general case completes Section 3. In Section 4 we generalize the
construction of Section 3 for the case of a upper semicontinuous value multifunction. In
Section 5 we prove the existence of a value multifunction.
2 Problem Statement
Let us consider a two-player differential game with the dynamics
x˙ = f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v), t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q. (1)
Here u and v are controls of player I and player II respectively. Payoffs are terminal. Player
I wants to maximize σ1(x(T )), whereas player II wants to maximize σ2(x(T )). We assume
that sets P and Q are compacts, functions f , g, σ1 and σ2 are continuous. In addition,
suppose that functions f and g are Lipschitz continuous with respect to the phase variable
and satisfy the sublinear growth condition with respect to x.
Denote
U := {u : [0, T ]→ P measurable},
2
V := {v : [0, T ]→ Q measurable}.
If u ∈ U , v ∈ V then denote by x(·, t0, x0, u, v) the solution of the initial value problem
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t)) + g(t, x(t), v(t)), x(t0) = x0.
We assume that the players use control with guide strategies (CGS). In this case the
control depends not only on a current position but also on a vector w. The vector w is
called a guide. The dimension of the guide can differ from n.
The control with guide strategy of player I U is a triple of functions (u, ψ1, χ1) such
that for some natural m the function u maps [0, T ]×Rn ×Rm to P , the function ψ1 maps
[0, T ]× [0, T ]× Rn × Rm to Rm, and χ1 is a function of [0, T ]× Rn with values in Rm.
The meaning of the functions u, ψ1, and χ1 is the following. Let w1 be a m-dimensional
vector. Further it denotes the state of first player’s guide. Player I computes the value of
the variable w1 using the rules which are given by the strategy U . The function u(t∗, x∗, w
1)
is a function forming the control of player I. It depends on the current position (t∗, x∗) and
the current state of guide w1. The function ψ1(t+, t∗, x∗, w
1) determines the value of the
guide at time t+ under condition that at time t∗ the phase vector is equal to x∗, the state
of guide is equal to w1. The function χ1(t0, x0) determines the initial state of guide.
Player I forms his control stepwise. Let (t0, x0) be an initial position, and let ∆ = {tk}
r
k=0
be a partition of the interval [t0, T ]. Suppose that player II chooses his control v[·] arbitrarily.
He can also use his own CGS and form the control v[·] stepwise. Denote the solution x[·]
of equation (1) with the initial condition x[t0] = x0 such that the control of player I is
equal to u(tk, xk, w
1
k) on [tk, tk+1[ by x
1[·, t0, x0, U,∆, v[·]]. Here the state of the system
at time tk is xk, the state of the first player’s guide is w
1
k; it is computed by the rule
w1k = ψ
1(tk, tk−1, xk−1, w
1
k−1) for k = 1, r, w
1
0 = χ
1(t0, x0).
The control with guide strategy of player II is defined analogously. It is a triple V =
(v, ψ2, χ2). Here v = v(t∗, x∗, w
2), ψ2 = ψ2(t+, t∗, x∗, w
2), χ2 = χ2(t0, x0)); (t∗, x∗) is a
current position, w2 denotes the guide of player II, (t0, x0) is an initial position. The
motion generated by a strategy V , a partition ∆ of the interval [t0, T ], and a measurable
control of player II u[·] is also constructed stepwise. Denote it by x2[·, t∗, x∗, V,∆, u[·]].
We assume that the Nash equilibrium is achieved when the players get the same par-
tition. Let ∆ = {tk}
m
k=0 be a partition of the interval [t0, T ]. Denote the solution x[·] of
equation (1) with the initial condition x[t0] = x0 such that the control of player I is equal
to u(tk, xk, w
1
k) on [tk, tk+1[, and the control of player II is equal to v(tk, xk, w
2
k) on [tk, tk+1[
by x(c)[·, t∗, x∗, U, V,∆]. Here xk denotes the state of the system at time tk; w
i
k is the state
of the i-th player’s guide at time tk. Recall that w
i
k+1 = ψ
i(tk+1, tk, xk, w
1
k), w
i
0 = χ
i(t0, x0),
i = 1, 2.
Definition 2.1. Let G ⊂ [0, T ] × Rn. A pair of control with guide strategies (U∗, V ∗) is
said to be a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G iff for all (t0, x0) ∈ G the following
inequalities hold:
lim
δ↓0
sup{σ1(x
2[T, t0, x0, V
∗,∆, u[·]]) : d(∆) ≤ δ, u[·] ∈ U}
≤ lim
δ↓0
inf{σ1(x
(c)[T, t0, x0, U
∗, V ∗,∆]) : d(∆) ≤ δ},
lim
δ↓0
sup{σ2(x
1[T, t0, x0, U
∗,∆, v[·]]) : d(∆) ≤ δ, v[·] ∈ V}
≤ lim
δ↓0
inf{σ2(x
(c)[T, t0, x0, U
∗, V ∗,∆]) : d(∆) ≤ δ}.
3
3 Continuous value function
In this section we assume that there exists a continuous function satisfying some viability
conditions.
3.1 Construction of Nash Equilibrium Strategies
Let (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n, u∗ ∈ P , v∗ ∈ Q.
Define
Sol1(t∗, x∗; v∗) := cl{x(·, t∗, x∗, u, v∗) : u ∈ U},
Sol2(t∗, x∗; u∗) := cl{x(·, t∗, x∗, u∗, v) : v ∈ V},
Sol(t∗, x∗) := cl{x(·, t∗, x∗, u, v) : u ∈ U , v ∈ V}.
Here cl denotes the closure in the space of continuous vector function on [0, T ]. Note, that
the sets Sol1(t∗, x∗; v∗), Sol
2(t∗, x∗; u∗), Sol(t∗, x∗) are compact.
Theorem 3.1. Let a continuous function (c1, c2) : [0, T ] × R
n → R2 satisfy the following
conditions:
(F1) ci(T, x) = σi(x), i = 1, 2;
(F2) for every (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]×R
n, u ∈ P there exists a motion y2(·) ∈ Sol2(t∗, x∗; u)
such that c1(t, y
2(t)) ≤ c1(t∗, x∗) for t ∈ [t∗, T ];
(F3) for every (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]×R
n, v ∈ Q there exists a motion y1(·) ∈ Sol1(t∗, x∗; v)
such that c2(t, y
1(t)) ≤ c2(t∗, x∗) for t ∈ [t∗, T ];
(F4) for every (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]×R
n there exists a motion y(c)(·) ∈ Sol(t∗, x∗) such that
ci(t, y
(c)(t)) = ci(t∗, x∗) for t ∈ [t∗, T ], i = 1, 2.
Then for each compact G ⊂ [0, T ]×Rn there exists a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium
on G. The corresponding payoff of player i is ci(t0, x0).
Note that conditions (F1)–(F4) were first derived in [3] as the sufficient condition for the
function (c1, c2) to provide Nash equilibrium payoff at the given position in the framework
of Kleimenov approach. In that papers the obtained equilibria aren’t universal.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is based on the Krasovskii-Subbotin extremal shift rule.
Let G ⊂ [0, T ]× Rn be a compact. Denote by E the reachable set from G:
E := {x(t, t∗, x∗, u, v) : (t∗, x∗) ∈ G, t ∈ [t∗, T ], u ∈ U , v ∈ V}. (2)
Put
K := max{‖f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v)‖ : t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ E, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q}, (3)
Let L be a Lipschitz constant of the function f + g on [0, T ] × E × P × Q, i.e. for all
t ∈ [0, T ], x′, x′′ ∈ E, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q
‖f(t, x′, u) + g(t, x′, v)− f(t, x′′, u)− g(t, x′′, v)‖ ≤ L‖x′ − x′′‖.
Also, put
ϕ∗(δ) := sup{‖f(t′, x, u) + g(t′, x, u)− f(t′′, x, u)− g(t′′, x, u)‖ :
t′, t′′ ∈ [0, T ], |t′ − t′′| ≤ δ, x ∈ E, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q}.
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Note that ϕ∗(δ)→ 0, as δ → 0.
Let us introduce the auxiliary controlled system
s˙ = h(t, s, ω1, ω2), s ∈ R
n, ωi ∈ Ωi. (4)
Below we consider two cases.
(i) Ω1 = P , Ω2 = Q, h = f + g;
(ii) Ω1 = P ×Q, Ω2 = ∅, h = f + g.
Note that in both cases system (4) satisfies the Isaacs condition.
Put β := 2L, R := max{‖s′ − s′′‖ : s′, s′′ ∈ E}, ϕ(δ) = 4ϕ∗(δ)R + 4K2δ.
The following lemma was proved by Krasovskii and Subbotins (see [17])
Lemma 3.1. Let s01, s
0
2 ∈ R
n, t∗ ∈ [0, T ], ω
∗
1 ∈ Ω1, ω
∗
2 ∈ Ω2 satisfy the following conditions
max
ω1∈Ω1
min
ω2∈Ω2
〈s02 − s
0
1, h(t∗, s
0
1, ω1, ω2)〉 = min
ω2∈Ω2
〈s02 − s
0
1, h(t∗, s
0
1, ω
∗
1, ω2)〉,
min
ω2∈Ω2
max
ω1∈Ω1
〈s02 − s
0
1, h(t∗, s
0
1, ω1, ω2)〉 = max
ω1∈Ω1
〈s02 − s
0
1, h(t∗, s
0
1, ω1, ω
∗
2)〉.
If s1(·) is a solution of the initial value problem
s˙1 = h(t, s1, ω
∗
1, ω2(t)), s1(t∗) = s
0
1,
and s2(·) is a solution of the initial value problem
s˙2 = h(t, s2, ω1(t), ω
∗
2), s2(t∗) = s
0
2,
for some measurable controls ω1(·) and ω2(·), then for all t+ ∈ [t∗, T ] the estimate
‖s2(t+)− s1(t+)‖
2 ≤ ‖s02 − s
0
1‖
2(1 + β(t+ − t∗)) + ϕ(t+ − t∗) · (t+ − t∗)
is fulfilled.
We assume that the i-th player’s guide wi is a quadruple (di, τ i, wi,(a), wi,(c)). The
variable di ∈ R describes an accumulated error, τ i ∈ [0, T ] is a previous time of the control
correction, wi,(a) ∈ Rn is a punishment part of the guide, and wi,(c) ∈ Rn is a consistent
part of the guide. The whole dimension of the guide is 2n+ 2.
For any (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ] × R
n, u ∈ P , v ∈ Q choose and fix a motion y2(·; t∗, x∗, u)
satisfying condition (F2), a motion y1(·; t∗, x∗, v) satisfying condition (F3), and a motion
y(c)(·; t∗, x∗) satisfying condition (F4).
Now let us define the strategies U∗ and V ∗. Below we prove that the pair of strategies
(U∗, V ∗) is a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G.
First put χ1(t0, x0) = χ
2(t0, x0) := (0, t0, x0, x0).
Let (t, x) be a position, wi = (di, τ i, wi,(a), wi,(c)) be a state of the i-th player’s guide.
Put
zi :=
{
wi,(c), ‖wi,(c) − x‖2 ≤ di(1 + β(t− τ i)) + ϕ(t− τ i)(t− τ i),
wi,(a), otherwise.
(5)
Let us consider two cases.
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i =1. Choose a control u∗ by the rule
max
u∈P
〈z1 − x, f(t, x, u)〉 = 〈z1 − x, f(t, x, u∗)〉. (6)
Further, let v∗ satisfy the following condition
min
v∈Q
〈z1 − x, g(t, x, v)〉 = 〈z1 − x, g(t, x, v∗)〉. (7)
Define u(t, x, w1) := u∗. For t+ > t put ψ
1(t+, t, x, w
1) be equal to w1+ =
(d1+, τ
1
+, w
1,(a)
+ , w
1,(c)
+ ), where
d1+ := ‖z
1 − x‖2, τ 1+ := t, w
1,(a)
+ := y
1(t+; t, z
1, v∗), w
1,(c)
+ := y
(c)(t+; t, z
1).
i =2. Let a control v∗ be such that
max
v∈Q
〈z2 − x, g(t, x, v)〉 = 〈z2 − x, g(t, x, v∗)〉. (8)
Choose u∗ satisfying the condition
min
u∈P
〈z2 − x, f(t, x, u)〉 = 〈z2 − x, f(t, x, u∗)〉. (9)
Set v(t, x, w) := v∗. For t+ > t put ψ
2(t+, t, x, w
2) be equal to w2+ =
(d2+, τ
2
+, w
2,(a)
+ , w
2,(c)
+ ), where
d2+ := ‖z
2 − x‖2, τ 2+ := t, w
2,(a)
+ := y
2(t+; t, z
2, u∗), w
2,(c)
+ := y
(c)(t+; t, z
2).
Note that
cj(t+, w
i,(c)
+ ) = cj(t, z
i) for all i, j = 1, 2, (10)
c1(t+, w
2,(a)
+ ) ≤ c1(t, z
2), c2(t+, w
1,(a)
+ ) ≤ c2(t, z
1). (11)
Below let x+ denote the state of the system at time t+.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that z1 = z2 = z. If players I and II use respectively the controls u∗
and v∗ on the interval [t, t+], then w
1,(c)
+ = w
2,(c)
+ and
‖x+ − w
i,(c)
+ ‖
2 ≤ di+(1 + β(t+ − τ+)) + ϕ(t+ − τ+)(t+ − τ+).
Proof. The controls u∗ and v∗ satisfy the condition
max
u∈P,v∈Q
〈z − x, f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v)〉 = 〈z − x, f(t, x, u∗) + g(t, x, v∗)〉.
We apply Lemma 3.1 with Ω1 = P × Q, Ω2 = ∅, h = f + g. If x(·) = x(·, t, x, u∗, v∗),
y(c)(·) = y(c)(·; t, z), then
‖x(t+)− y
(c)(t+)‖
2 ≤ ‖x− z‖2(1 + β(t+ − t)) + ϕ(t+ − t) · (t+ − t).
The definition of the strategies U∗ and V ∗ yields that w
i,(c)
+ = y
(c)(t+) for i = 1, 2. By
construction of the functions ψi, i = 1, 2 we have that t = τ
i
+, and d
i
+ = ‖x − z‖
2. This
completes the proof of the Lemma.
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Lemma 3.3. If player I uses the control u∗ on the interval [t, t+], then
‖x+ − w
1,(a)
+ ‖
2 ≤ di+(1 + β(t+ − τ+)) + ϕ(t+ − τ+)(t+ − τ+), i = 1, 2.
Proof. We apply Lemma 3.1 with Ω1 = P , Ω2 = Q and h = f + g. The choice of u∗ (see
(6)) and v∗ (see (7)) yields that the inequality
‖x(t+)− y
1(t+)‖
2 ≤ ‖x− z1‖2(1 + β(t+ − t)) + ϕ(t+ − t) · (t+ − t)
holds with x(·) = x(·, t, x, u∗, v) and y
1(·) = y1(·, t, z1, v∗). Since w
1,(a)
+ = y
1(t+), τ
1
+ = t,
and d1+ = ‖x− z
1‖2, the conclusion of the Lemma follows.
We need the following estimate. Let ∆ = {tk}
r
k=0 be a partition of the interval [t0, T ],
and let {γk}
r
k=0 be a collection of numbers such that
γk+1 ≤ γk(1 + β(tk+1 − tk)) + ϕ((tk+1 − tk)) · ((tk+1 − tk)). (12)
Then,
γk ≤ [γ0 + (1 + (tk − t0))ϕ(d(∆))] exp β(tk − t0). (13)
Proof of Theorem 3.1 First let us show that for all (t0, x0) ∈ G the following equality is
valid:
cj(t0, x0) = lim
δ↓0
inf{σj(x
(c)[T, t0, x0, U
∗, V ∗,∆]), d(∆) ≤ δ}, j = 1, 2. (14)
Let ∆ = {tk}
r
k=1 be a partition of the interval [t0, T ]. Denote the state of the system at
time tk by xk, the state of the i-th player’s guide by w
i
k = (d
i
k, τk, w
(a),i
k , w
i,(c)
k ). Also let z
i
k
be chosen by rule (5) at time tk. We have that τ0 = t0, τk+1 = tk for k ≥ 0. Moreover,
z10 = w
1,(c)
0 = w
1,(c)
0 = z
2
0 .
Hence using lemma 3.2 inductively we get that
z1k = w
1,(c)
k = z
2
k = w
2,(c)
k , d
i
k+1 = ‖xk − z
i
k‖
2. (15)
and
‖xk+1 − z
i
k+1‖
2 ≤ ‖xk − z
i
k‖
2(1 + β(tk+1 − tk)) + ϕ(tk+1 − tk)(tk+1 − tk)
for all k = 0, N .
It follows from (13) that
‖xr − z
i
r‖
2 ≤ [‖x0 − z
i
0‖
2 + (1 + (tr − t0))ϕ(d(∆))] exp β(tr − t0).
Since zi0 = x0, we obtain that
‖xr − z
i
r‖ ≤ κ(δ) :=
[
(1 + (tr − t0))ϕ(δ) exp β(tr − t0)
]1/2
, (16)
where δ = d(∆). Note that κ(δ)→ 0, δ → 0.
Let φj(Y ) be a modulus of continuity of the function σj on the set E
φj(γ) := sup{|σj(x
′)− σj(x
′′)| : x′, x′′ ∈ E, ‖x′ − x′′‖ ≤ γ}.
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We have, that
‖σj(xr)− σj(z
i
r)‖ ≤ φj(κ(δ)). (17)
Since zik = w
i,(c)
k , it follows from (10) that cj(tk+1, w
i,(c)
k+1) = cj(tk, z
i
k) = cj(tk, w
i,(c)
k ).
Therefore, using condition (F1) we get
‖σj(x[T, t0, x0, U
∗, V ∗,∆])− cj(t0, x0)‖ ≤ φj(κ(δ))
with δ = d(∆). Passing to the limit we obtain equality (14).
Now let us show that for all (t0, x0) ∈ G
c2(t0, x0) ≥ lim
δ↓0
sup{σ2(x
1[T, t0, x0, U
∗,∆, v[·]), d(∆) ≤ δ, v[·] ∈ V}. (18)
Let ∆ = {tk}
r
k=1 be a partition of the interval [t0, T ], and let v[·] be a control of player
II. Denote the state of the system at time tk by xk, the state of the first player’s guide by
w1k = (d
1
k, τk, w
(a),1
k , w
1,(c)
k ). Also let z
1
k be chosen by rule (5) at time tk.
We claim that inequality (12) is valid with γk = ‖z
1
k−xk‖
2. Note that τ 1k+1 = tk, d
1
k+1 =
‖z1k − xk‖
2. If z1k+1 = w
1,(c)
k+1 , then inequality (12) holds by construction. If z
1
k+1 = w
1,(c)
k+1 ,
then using lemma 3.3 we obtain that inequality (12) is fulfilled also.
Therefore, we have inequality (13) with γ0 = 0 and γk = ‖z
1
k − xk‖
2. Hence,
‖z1r − xr‖ ≤ κ(d(∆)).
Consequently, inequality (17) is fulfilled for i = 1, j = 2.
It follows from (5), (10), and (11) that
c2(tk+1, z
1
k+1) ≤ c2(tk, z
1
k). (19)
Condition (F1) and the equality z10 = x0 yield the inequality
σ2(z
1
r ) = c2(T, z
1
r ) ≤ c2(t0, x0).
From this and (19) we conclude that
σ2(x
1[T, t0, x0, U
∗,∆, v[·]]) ≤ c2(t0, x0) + φ2(κ(δ)),
with δ = d(∆). Passing to the limit we get inequality (18).
Analogously one can prove the inequality
c1(t0, x0) ≥ lim
δ↓0
sup{σ1(x
2[T, t0, x0, V
∗,∆, u[·]), d(∆) ≤ δ, u[·] ∈ U}. (20)
Combining equality (14) and inequalities (18), (20) we conclude that the strategies U∗ and
V ∗ form the Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G. Moreover the Nash equilibrium
payoff of player i at the position (t0, x0) is ci(t0, x0).
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3.2 Infinitesimal Form of Conditions (F1)–(F4)
Define
H1(t, x, s) := max
u∈P
min
v∈Q
〈s, f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v)〉,
H2(t, x, s) := max
v∈Q
min
u∈P
〈s, f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v)〉.
Proposition 3.1. Conditions (F2), and (F3) are equivalent to the the following one: the
function ci is viscosity supersolution of the equation
∂ci
∂t
+Hi(t, x,∇ci) = 0. (21)
This Proposition directly follows from [20, Theorem 6.4].
Further, define a modulus derivative at the position (t, x) in the direction w ∈ Rn by
the rule
dabs(c1, c2)(t, x;w) := lim inf
δ↓0,w′→w
|c1(t+ δ, x+ δw
′)− c1(t, x)|+ |c2(t + δ, x+ δw
′)− c2(t, x)|
δ
.
Proposition 3.2. Condition (F4) is valid if and only if for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn
inf
w∈F(t,x)
dabs(c1, c2)(t, x;w) = 0.
Proof. Condition (F4) means that the graph of the function (c1, c2) is viable under the
differential inclusion x˙J˙1
J˙2
 = co

 f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v)0
0
 : u ∈ P, v ∈ Q
 .
One can rewrite this condition in the infinitesimal form [1, Theorem 11.1.3]: for J1 =
c1(t, x), J2 = c2(t, x) and some w ∈ co{f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v) : u ∈ P, v ∈ Q} the inclusion w0
0
 ∈ Dgr(c1, c2)(t, (x, J1, J2)) (22)
holds. Here D denotes the contingent derivative. It is defined in the following way. Let
G ⊂ [0, T ]× Rm, G[t] denote a section of G by t:
G[t] := {w ∈ Rm : (t, x) ∈ G},
and let the symbol d denote the Euclidian distance between a point and a set. Following
[1] set
DG(t, y) :=
{
h ∈ Rm : lim inf
δ→0
d(y + δh;G[t+ δ])
δ
= 0
}
.
Let Ji = ci(t, x). We have that (w, Y1, Y2) ∈ Dgr(c1, c2)(t, (x, J1, J2)) if and only if there
exist sequences {wk}
∞
k=1 and {δk}
∞
k=1 such that w = limk→∞wk, and
Yi = lim
k→∞
ci(t+ δk, x+ δkwk)− ci(t, x)
δk
.
Therefore, condition (22) is equivalent to the condition dabs(c1, c2)(t, x;w) = 0 for some
w ∈ co{f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v) : u ∈ P, v ∈ Q}.
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3.3 System of Hamilton–Jacobi equations
Let us show that Theorem 3.1 generalizes the method based on the system of Hamilton–
Jacobi equations.
It is well known that the solutions of the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations provide
Nash equilibria [5].
For any s ∈ Rn let uˆ(t, x, s1) satisfy the condition
〈s, f(t, x, uˆ(t, x, s))〉 = max{〈s, f(t, x, u)〉 : u ∈ P},
and let vˆ(t, x, s) satisfy the condition
〈s, g(t, x, vˆ(t, x, s))〉 = max{〈s, g(t, x, u)〉 : u ∈ P}.
Set
Hi(t, x, s1, s2) := 〈si, f(t, x, uˆ(t, x, s1)) + g(t, x, vˆ(t, x, s2))〉.
Consider the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations{
∂ϕi
∂t
+Hi(t, x,∇ϕ1,∇ϕ2) = 0,
ϕi(T, x) = σi(x).
i = 1, 2 (23)
Proposition 3.3. If the function (ϕ1, ϕ2) is a classical solution of system (23), then it
satisfies condition (F1)–(F4).
Proof. Condition (F1) is obvious.
Since (ϕ1, ϕ2) is the solution of system (23), we have that
0 =
∂ϕ1(t, x)
∂t
+max
u∈P
〈∇ϕ1(t, x), f(t, x, u)〉+ 〈∇ϕ1(t, x), g(t, x, vˆ(t, x,∇ϕ1(t, x)))〉
≥
∂ϕ1(t, x)
∂t
+max
u∈P
〈∇ϕ1(t, x), f(t, x, u)〉+min
v∈Q
〈∇ϕ1(t, x), g(t, x, v)〉
=
∂ϕ1(t, x)
∂t
+H1(t, x,∇ϕ1(t, x)).
The subdifferential of the smooth function ϕ1 is equal to D
−ϕ1(t, x) =
{(∂ϕ1(t, x)/∂t,∇ϕ1(t, x))}. Therefore, ϕ1 is a viscosity supersolution of equation (21) for
i = 1 [20, Definition (U4)]. This is equivalent to condition (F2).
Condition (F3) is proved in the same way.
dabs(ϕ1, ϕ2)(t, x;w) =
∣∣∣∣∂ϕ1(t, x)∂t + 〈∇ϕ1(t, x), w〉
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∂ϕ2(t, x)∂t + 〈∇ϕ2(t, x), w〉
∣∣∣∣ .
Substituting w = f(t, x, uˆ(t, x,∇ϕ1(t, x))) + g(t, x, vˆ(t, x,∇ϕ2(t, x))) gives condi-
tion (F4).
Generally, there exists a smooth function (c1, c2) satisfying conditions (F1)–(F4) not
being a solution of the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations.
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Example 3.1. Consider the system {
x˙1 = −v
x˙2 = 2u+ v
(24)
Here t ∈ [0, 1], u, v ∈ [−1, 1]. The purpose of the i-th player is to maximize xi(1).
The function (c∗1, c
∗
2) with c
∗
1(t, x1, x2) = x1 + (1− t), c
∗
2(t, x1, x2) = x2 + (1− t) satisfies
conditions (F1)–(F4), but it is not a solution of the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations
(23). Moreover, c∗i (t, x) > ϕi(t, x) for some solutions of system (23) (ϕ1, ϕ2).
Proof. First let us write down the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations for the case under
consideration. Denote ∂ϕ1/∂xj by pj, ∂ϕ2/∂xj by qj.
The variables uˆ and vˆ satisfy the conditions
max
u∈[−1,1]
p2u = p2uˆ, max
v∈[−1,1]
(−q1 + q2)v = (−q1 + q2)vˆ.
Hence the system of Hamilton–Jacobi equations (23) takes the form{
∂ϕ1
∂t
− p1vˆ + p2(2uˆ+ vˆ) = 0,
∂ϕ2
∂t
− q1vˆ + q2(2uˆ+ vˆ) = 0.
(25)
The boundary conditions are ϕ1(1, x1, x2) = x1, ϕ2(1, x1, x2) = x2.
The function (c∗1, c
∗
2) satisfies conditions (F1)–(F4). Indeed, condition (F1) holds obvi-
ously. Condition (F2) is valid with v = 1, analogously condition (F3) is valid with u = −1.
Moreover both players can keep the values of the functions if they use the controls v = −1,
u = 1. This means that condition (F4) holds also.
On the other hand the pair of functions (c∗1, c
∗
2) does not satisfy the system of Hamilton–
Jacobi equations. Indeed,
∂c∗1/∂x1 = p1 = 1, ∂c
∗
1/∂x2 = p2 = 0, ∂c
∗
2/∂x1 = q1 = 0,
∂c∗2/∂x2 = q2 = 1, ∂c
∗
1/∂t = ∂c
∗
2/∂t = −1.
Therefore, vˆ = 1. Substitution into the first equation of (25) leads to the contradiction.
Further, consider the functions ϕ1(t, x1, x2) = x1 − (1 − t), ϕ
α
2 (t, x1, x2) = x2 + (1 +
2α)(1− t). Here α is a parameter from [−1, 1]. Note that if vˆ = 1 and uˆ = α, then (ϕ1, ϕ
α
2 )
is a classical solution of system (25).
We have that for α ∈ [−1, 0)
c∗1(t, x1, x2) > ϕ1(t, x1, x2), c
∗
1(t, x1, x2) > ϕ
α
1 (t, x1, x2).
3.4 Problem of Continuous Value Function Existence
The continuous function (c1, c2) satisfying conditions (F1)–(F4) does not exist in the
general case.
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Example 3.2. Let the dynamics of the system be given by
x˙ = u, t ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ R, u ∈ [−1, 1].
The purpose of the first player is to maximize |x(1)|. The second player is fictitious, and
his purpose is to maximize x(1). In this case there is no continuous function satisfying
conditions (F1)–(F4).
Proof. Let a function (c1, c2) : [0, 1]×R→ R
2 satisfy conditions (F1)–(F4). Condition (F2)
means that
c1(t, x) ≥ c1
(
t+, x+
∫ t+
t
u(θ)dθ
)
(26)
for any u ∈ U , t+ ∈ [t, 1]. In particular, c1(t, x) ≥ |x|+ (1− t). Condition (F4) means that
there exists a control u∗ such that
c1(t, x) =
∣∣∣∣x+ ∫ 1
t
u∗(τ)dτ
∣∣∣∣ , c2(t, x) = x+ ∫ 1
t
u∗(τ)dτ. (27)
This yields the inequality
c1(t, x) ≤ max
u∈[−1,1]
|x+ u(1− t)| = |x|+ (1− t).
From this, and (26) it follows that c1(t, x) = |x| + (1 − t). Moreover, u∗(·) ≡ 1 for x ≥ 0,
and u∗(·) ≡ −1 for x ≤ 0. Hence, c2(t, x) = x+ (1− t) for x > 0 and c2(t, x) = x− (1− t)
for x < 0.
The example shows that we need to modify Theorem 3.1 for the case of discontinuous
value functions.
4 Multivalued Value Functions
Theorem 4.1. Assume that there exists an upper semicontinuous multivalued function
S : [0, T ]× Rn ⇒ R2 with nonempty images satisfying the following conditions:
(S1) S(T, x) = {(σ1(x), σ2(x))}, x ∈ R
n;
(S2) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (J1, J2) ∈ S(t, x), u ∈ P and t+ ∈ [t, T ] there exist a
motion y2(·) ∈ Sol2(t, x; u) and a pair (J ′1, J
′
2) ∈ S(t+, y
2(t+)) such that J1 ≥ J
′
1;
(S3) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (J1, J2) ∈ S(t, x), v ∈ Q and t+ ∈ [t, T ] there exist a
motion y1(·) ∈ Sol1(t, x; u) and a pair (J ′′1 , J
′′
2 ) ∈ S(t+, y
1(t+)) such that J2 ≥ J
′′
2 ;
(S4) for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (J1, J2) ∈ S(t, x) and t+ ∈ [t, T ] there exists a motion
y(c)(·) ∈ Sol(t∗, x∗) such that (J1, J2) ∈ S(t+, y
(c)(t+)).
Then for any selector (Jˆ1, Jˆ2) of the multivalued function S and a compact set G ⊂ [0, T ]×
R
n there exists a Control with Guide Nash equilibrium on G such that corresponding Nash
equilibrium payoff at (t0, x0) ∈ G is (Jˆ1(t0, x0), Jˆ2(t0, x0)) ∈ S(t0, x0).
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Remark 4.1. Let U∗, V∗ be Nash equilibrium strategies constructed for the compact G ⊂
[0, T ]×Rn and the selector (Jˆ1, Jˆ2). The value of (Jˆ1, Jˆ2) may vary along the Nash trajectory
xc∗[·], that is a limit of step-by-step motions generated by U∗ and V∗. However, it follows
from Theorem 4.1 that for any intermediate time instant θ there exists a pair of Nash
equilibrium strategies such that the corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff at (θ, xc∗[θ]) is
equal to the value of (Jˆ1, Jˆ2) at the initial position.
Analogously, if x1∗[·] is a limit of step-by-by step motions generated by strategy of player
I U∗, and a control of player II v[·], then for any intermediate time instant θ there exists a
pair of Nash equilibrium strategies such that the corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff at
(θ, x1∗[θ]) of the player II doesn’t exceed the value of the function Jˆ2 at the initial position.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 To prove the theorem we modify the construction of the guide pro-
posed in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We assume that the guide consists of the following
components: d ∈ R is an accumulated error, τ ∈ R is a previous time of correction, w(a) is
a punishment part of the guide, w(c) is a consistent part of the guide, Y1 ∈ R, Y2 ∈ R are
expected payoffs of the players.
Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn be a position, t+ > t, (J1, J2) ∈ S(t, x), u ∈ P , v ∈ Q. Let
a motion y2(·) satisfy condition (S2). Denote b2(t+, t, x, J1, J2, u) := y
2(t+). Analogously
let y1(·) satisfy condition (S3). Put b1(t+, t, x, J1, J2, v) := y
1(t+). Also, if y
(c)(·) satisfies
condition (S4), then denote bc(t+, t, x, J1, J2) := y
(c)(t+).
First let us define the functions
χ1(t, x) = χ2(t, x) := (d0, τ0, w
(c)
0 , w
(a)
0 , Y1,0, Y2,0)
by the following rule: d0 := 0, τ0 := t, w
(c)
0 = w
(a)
0 := x, Y1,0 := Jˆ1(t0, x0), Y2,0 := Jˆ2(t0, x0).
Now we shall define controls and transitional functions of the guides. Let t be a time
instant. Assume that at time t the state of the system is x, and the state of the i-th player’s
guide is wi = (di, τ i, w(a),i, w(c),i, Y i1 , Y
i
2 ). Define z
i by rule (5). Now let us consider the case
of the first player. Put
(Y 11,+, Y
1
2,+) :=
{
(Y i1 , Y
i
2 ), z
1 = w(c),1
(Y ′′1 , Y
′′
2 ), z
1 = w(a),1.
Here (Y ′′1 , Y
′′
2 ) is an element of S(t, w
(a),1) such that Y ′′2 = min{J2 : (J1, J2) ∈ S(t, w
(a),1)}.
Choose u∗ by rule (6), and v
∗ by (7). As above, put u(t, x, w) := u∗, also set
ψ1(t+, t, x, w
1) := (d1+, τ
1
+, w
(a),1
+ , w
(c),1
+ , Y
1
1,+, Y
1
2,+) where
d1+ = ‖z
1 − x‖2, τ 1+ = t, w
(a),1
+ = b1(t+, t, z
1, Y 11,+, Y
1
2,+, v∗),
w
(c),1
+ = bc(t+, t, z
1, Y 11,+, Y
1
2,+).
The case of the second player is considered in the same way. Put
(Y 21,+, Y
2
2,+) :=
{
(Y i1 , Y
i
2 ), z
2 = w(c),2
(Y ′1 , Y
′
2), z
2 = w(a),2.
Here (Y ′1 , Y
′
2) is an element of S(t+, w
(a),2) such that Y ′1 = min{J1 : (J1, J2) ∈ S(t, w
(a),2)}.
Let v∗ satisfy condition (8). Also, let u
∗ satisfy condition (9). Put v(t, x, w) := v∗. Further,
set ψ2(t+, t, x, w
2) := (d2+, τ
2
+, w
(a),1
+ , w
(c),2
+ , Y
2
1,+, Y
2
2,+) where
d2+ = ‖z
2 − x‖2, τ+ = t, w
(a),2
+ = b2(t+, t, z
2, Y 21,+, Y
2
2,+, v∗),
w
(c),2
+ = bc(t+, t, z
2, Y 21,+, Y
2
2,+).
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Let us show that for any position (t0, x0) ∈ G the following equality is fulfilled
Jˆi = lim
δ↓0
inf{σi(x
(c)[T, t0, x0, U
∗, V ∗,∆]), d(∆) ≤ δ}, i = 1, 2. (28)
Let ∆ = {tk}
r
k=0 be a partition of [t0, T ], d(∆) ≤ δ, x
c[·] := xc[·, t∗, x∗, U
∗, V ∗,∆].
Extend the partition ∆ by adding the element tr+1 = tr = T . Denote xk := x
c[tk]. Let
us denote the state of the i-th player’s guide at time tk by w
i
k = (d
i
k, w
(a),i
k , w
(c),i
k , Y
i
1,k, Y
i
2,k).
Let zik be a position chosen by rule (5) for the i-th player at time tk.
It follows from lemma 3.2 that the point zik is equal to w
(c),i
k . In addition, w
(c),1
k = w
(c),2
k ,
and the following inequality is valid:
‖xk − w
(c),i
k ‖ ≤ ‖xk−1 − z
i
k−1‖
2(1 + β(tk − τk−1)) + ϕ(tk − τk−1)(tk − τk−1).
Applying this inequality sequentially and using the equality zi0 = x0 we get estimate (16)
for i = 1, 2. Further, estimate (17) holds for i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2. The choice of zik yields
that (Y i1,k, Y
i
2,k) = (Y
i
1,k−1, Y
i
2,k−1), and (Y
i
1,k, Y
i
2,k) ∈ S(tk−1, z
1
k−1) for k = 1, r + 1. Also,
the construction of the function χi leads to the equality (Y
i
1,0, Y
i
2,0) = (Jˆ1(t0, x0), Jˆ2(t0, x0)).
Hence, (Jˆ1(t0, x0), Jˆ2(t0, x0)) ∈ S(tr, z
i
r) = {(σ1(z
i
r), σ2(z
i
r))}. By (17) we conclude that
equality (28) holds.
Now let us prove that for any position (t0, x0) ∈ G the following inequality is fulfilled:
Jˆ2(t0, x0) ≥ lim
δ↓0
sup{σ2(x
1[T, t0, x0, U
∗,∆, v[·]]), d(∆) ≤ δ, v[·] ∈ V}. (29)
As above, let ∆ = {tk}
r
k=0 be a partition of the interval [t0, T ], d(∆) ≤ δ, x
1[·] =
x1[·, t0, x0, U
∗,∆, v[·]]. We add the element tr+1 = tr = T to the partition ∆. De-
note xk := x
1[tk]. Let us denote the state of the first player’s guide at time tk by
w1k = (d
1
k, w
(a),1
k , w
(c),1
k , Y
1
1,k, Y
1
2,k). Further, let z
1
k be a point chosen by rule (5) for the
first player at time tk.
The choice of z1k (see (5)) and lemma 3.3 yield the inequality
‖xk − z
1
k‖
2 ≤ ‖xk−1 − z
1
k−1‖
2(1 + β(tk − tk−1)) + ϕ(tk − tk−1)(tk − tk−1).
Applying this inequality sequentially and using the equality z10 = x0 we get estimate (16)
for i = 1. Therefore, inequality (17) is fulfilled for i = 1, j = 2. In addition, Y 12,k ≥ Y
2
2,k−1.
Indeed, if z1k = w
(c),1
k , then (Y
1
1,k, Y
1
2,k) = (Y
1
1,k−1, Y
1
2,k−1). If z
1
k = w
(a),1
k , we have that an
element (Y 11,k, Y
1
2,k) is chosen so that Y
1
2,k is the minimum of {J2 : (J1, J2) ∈ S(tk−1, z
1
k−1)}.
By the construction we have (Y 11,k, Y
1
1,k) ∈ S(tk−1, z
1
k−1). Hence, using condition (S1) we
obtain that
Jˆ2(t0, x0) ≥ Y
1
2,r+1 = σ2(z
1
r ). (30)
Since inequality (17) is valid for i = 1, j = 2, estimate (30) yields inequality (29).
Analogously, we get that for any position (t0, x0) ∈ G the inequality
Jˆ1(t0, x0) ≥ lim
δ↓0
sup{σ1(x
2[T, t0, x0, V
∗,∆, u[·]]), d(∆) ≤ δ, u[·] ∈ U} (31)
is fulfilled.
Equality (28) and inequalities (29), (31) mean that the pair of strategies U∗ and V ∗
is a Nash equilibrium on G. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium payoff at the initial position
(t0, x0) ∈ G is equal to (Jˆ1(t0, x0), Jˆ2(t0, x0)).
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5 Existence of Multivalued Value Function
5.1 Discrete Time Game
In order to prove the existence of a multivalued function satisfying conditions (S1)–(S4)
we consider the auxiliary discrete time dynamical game. Let N be a natural number, and let
δN := T/N be a time step. We discretize [0, T ] by means of the uniform grid ∆N := {tNk }
N
k=0
with tNk = kδ
N .
Consider the discrete time control system
ξN(tNk+1) = ξ
N(tk)+δ
N [f(tNk , ξ
N(tNk ), u(t
N
k )) + g(t
N
k , ξ
N(tNk ), v(t
N
k ))],
k = 0, N − 1, u(tNk ) ∈ P, v(t
N
k ) ∈ Q.
(32)
Denote
UN := {u : [0, T ]→ P : u(t) = uNk ∈ P for t ∈ [t
N
k , t
N
k+1[},
VN := {v : [0, T ]→ Q : v(t) = vNk ∈ Q for t ∈ [t
N
k , t
N
k+1[}.
For t∗ ∈ ∆
N , ξ∗ ∈ R
n, u ∈ UN , and v ∈ VN let ξN(·, t∗, ξ∗, u, v) : ∆
N ∩ [t∗, T ] → R
n be
a solution of initial value problem (32), ξN(t∗) = ξ∗.
First, we shall estimate ‖ξN(t+, t∗, ξ∗, u, v)− x(t+, t∗, x∗, u, v)‖.
Let G ⊂ [0, T ] × Rn be a compact of initial positions. Let E ′ ⊂ Rn be a compact
such that x(t, t∗, x∗, u, v) ∈ E
′, and ξN(t, t∗, x∗, u, v) ∈ E
′ for all natural N , (t∗, x∗) ∈ G,
t, t∗ ∈ ∆
N , u ∈ UN , v ∈ VN . Set
K ′ := max{‖f(t, x, u) + g(t, x, v)‖ : t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ E ′, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q}.
Denote by L′ the Lipschitz constant of the function f + g on [0, T ] × E ′ × P × Q: for all
t ∈ [0, T ], x′, x′′ ∈ E ′, u ∈ P , v ∈ Q
‖f(t, x′, u) + g(t, x′, v)− f(t, x′′, u)− g(t, x′′, v)‖ ≤ L′‖x′ − x′′‖.
Further, set
ϕ′(δ) := sup{‖f(t′, x′, u)− f(t′′, x′′, u)‖+ ‖g(t′, x′, v)− g(t′′, x′′, v)‖ :
t′, t′′ ∈ [0, T ], x′, x′′ ∈ E ′, |t′ − t′| ≤ δ, ‖x′ − x′′‖ ≤ K ′δ, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q}.
Lemma 5.1. If t∗, t+ ∈ ∆
N , t+ ≥ t∗, (t∗, x∗), (t∗, ξ∗) ∈ G, u ∈ U
N , and v ∈ VN , then,
‖x(t+, t∗, x∗, u, v)− ξ
N(t+, t∗, ξ∗, u, v)‖
≤ ‖x∗ − ξ∗‖ exp(2L
′(t+ − t∗)) + ϕ
′(δN) exp(L′(t+ − t∗)).
(33)
Proof. Let m and r be natural numbers such that t∗ = t
N
m, t+ = t
N
r . Denote x(·) :=
x(·, t∗, x∗, u, v), xk := x(t
N
k , t∗, x∗, u, v), ξk := ξ
N(tNk , t∗, ξ∗, u, v). We have that
xk+1 =xk +
∫ tN
k+1
tN
k
[f(t, x(t), uk) + g(t, x(t), vk)]dt
=xk + δ
N [f(tNk , xk, uk) + g(t
N
k xk, vk)]
+
∫ tN
k+1
tN
k
[f(t, x(t), uk) + g(t, x(t), vk)− f(t
N
k , xk, uk)− g(t
N
k , xk, vk)]dt.
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Here uk and vk denote the values of u and v on [t
N
k , t
N
k+1[ respectively.
Further,
‖x(t)− xk‖ ≤ K
′(t− tk), t ∈ [tk, tk+1].
Therefore, the following inequality is fulfilled:∫ tk+1
tk
[f(t, x(t), uk) + g(t, x(t), vk)− f(t
N
k , xk, uk)− g(t
N
k , xk, vk)]dt ≤ δ
Nϕ(δN).
Hence,
‖xk+1 − xk − δ
N [f(tNk , xk, uk) + g(t
N
k , xk, vk)]‖ ≤ δ
Nϕ(δN). (34)
Further, we have
xk + δ
N [f(tNk , xk, uk) + g(t
N
k , xk, vk)]− ξk+1
= xk − ξk + δ
N [f(tNk , xk, uk) + g(t
N
k , xk, vk)− f(t
N
k , ξk, uk)− g(t
N
k , ξk, vk)].
Consequently,
‖xk + δ
N [f(tNk , xk, uk) + g(t
N
k , xk, vk)]− ξk+1‖ ≤ ‖xk − ξk‖+ δ
N2L′‖xk − ξk‖.
This inequality and estimate (34) yield that
‖xk+1 − ξk+1‖ ≤ ‖xk − ξk‖+ δ
N2L‖xk − ξk‖+ δ
Nϕ(δN).
Applying the last inequality sequentially we get inequality (33).
Now let us proof the existence of a function satisfying discrete time analogs of conditions
(S1)–(S4).
Theorem 5.1. For any natural N there exists an upper semicontinuous multivalued func-
tion ZN : ∆N × Rn ⇒ R2 satisfying the following properties
1. ZN(T, ξ) = {(σ1(ξ), σ2(ξ))};
2. for all (t∗, ξ∗) ∈ ∆
N × Rn, u ∈ P , (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z
N(t∗, ξ∗) and t+ ∈ ∆
N , t+ > t∗
there exist a control v ∈ VN and a pair (Y ′1 , Y
′
2) ∈ Z
N(t+, ξ
N(t+, t∗, ξ∗, u, v)) such that
Y1 ≥ Y
′
1 ;
3. for all (t∗, ξ∗) ∈ ∆
N × Rn, v ∈ Q, (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z
N (t∗, ξ∗) and t+ ∈ ∆
N , t+ > t∗ there
exist a control u ∈ VN and a pair (Y ′′1 , Y
′′
2 ) ∈ Z
N(t+, ξ
N(t+, t∗, ξ∗, u, v)) such that
Y2 ≥ Y
′′
2 ;
4. for all (t∗, ξ∗) ∈ ∆
N × Rn, (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z
N(t∗, ξ∗) and t+ ∈ ∆
N , t+ > t∗ there exist
controls u ∈ UN and v ∈ VN such that (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z
N(t+, ξ
N(t+, t∗, ξ∗, u, v)).
Proof. In the proof we fix the number N and omit the superindex N . Denote
fk(z, u) := δf(tk, z, u), gk(z, v) := δg(tk, z, v).
The proof is by inverse induction on k. For k = N put Z(tN , z) := {σ1(z), σ2(z)}.
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Now let k ∈ 0, N − 1. Assume that the values Z(tk+1, z), . . . , Z(tN , z) are constructed
for all z ∈ Rn. In addition, suppose that the functions Z(tk+1, ·), . . . , Z(tN , ·) are upper
semicontinuous. Define
ς ik+1(z) := min{Yi : (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z(tk+1, z)}, i = 1, 2.
It follows from the upper semicontinuity of the multivalued function Z(tk+1, ·) that the
functions ς1k+1 and ς
2
k+1 are lower semicontinuity.
Set
Wk(z) :=
⋃
u∈P,v∈Q
Z(tk+1, ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)),
̺1k(z) := max
u∈P
min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)), (35)
̺2k(z) := max
v∈Q
min
u∈P
ς2k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)). (36)
We claim that the multivalued function Wk is upper semicontinuous. Indeed, let z
l → z∗,
and let (Y l1 , Y
l
2 ) ∈ Wk(z
l) be such that (Y l1 , Y
l
2 ) → (Y
∗
1 , Y
∗
2 ). We have that (Y
l
1 , Y
l
2 ) ∈
Z(tk+1, ξ(tk+1, tk, z
l, ul, vl)) for some ul ∈ P , vl ∈ Q. We can assume without loss of
generality that (ul, vl) → (u∗, v∗). By the continuity of the functions fk and gk we get
that ξ(tk+1, tk, z
l, ul, vl) = zl + fk(z
l, ul) + gk(z
l, vl) → ξ(tk+1, tk, z
∗, u∗, v∗), as l → ∞.
The upper semicontinuity of the multivalued function Z(tk+1, ·) yields that (Y
∗
1 , Y
∗
2 ) ∈
Z(tk+1, ξ(tk+1, tk, z
∗, u∗, v∗)) ⊂Wk(z
∗).
Now let us show that the functions ̺ik are lower semicontinuous. We give the
proof only for the case i = 1. For a fixed u ∈ P consider the function z 7→
minv∈Q ς
1
k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)). We shall prove that this function is lower semicontinuous,
i.e. for any z∗ the following inequality holds:
lim inf
z→z∗
min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)) ≥ min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z
∗, u, v)). (37)
Let {zl}∞l=1 be a minimizing sequence:
lim inf
z→z∗
min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)) = lim
l→∞
min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z
l, u, v)).
Let vl ∈ Q satisfy the condition
ςk+11 (ξ(tk+1, tk, z
l, u, vl)) = min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z
l, u, v)).
Hence we have
lim inf
z→z∗
min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)) = lim
l→∞
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z
l, u, vl)). (38)
We can assume without loss of generality that the sequence {vl} converges to a control
v∗ ∈ Q. From continuity of the function ξ(tk+1, tk, ·, u, ·) and lower semicontinuity of the
function ς1k+1 we obtain that
lim
l→∞
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z
l, u, vl)) ≥ ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z
∗, u, v∗)) ≥ min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z
∗, u, v)).
17
This inequality and equality (38) lead inequality (37).
Since the functions z 7→ minv∈Q ς
k+1
1 (ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v)) are lower semicontinuous for
each u ∈ P , the function
̺k1(z) = max
u∈P
min
v∈Q
ςk+11 (ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u, v))
is lower semicontinuous.
Put
Z(tk, z) := {(Y1, Y2) ∈ W
k(z) : Yi ≥ ̺
i
k(z), i = 1, 2}. (39)
First, we shall prove that it is nonempty. Let z ∈ Rn. Let u∗ maximize the right-
hand side of (35), and let v∗ maximize the right-hand side of (36). Choose (Y1, Y2) ∈
Z(tk+1, ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u∗, v∗)). We have that (Y1, Y2) ∈ Wk(z). Further,
̺ik(z) ≤ ς
i
k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, z, u∗, v∗)) ≤ Yi.
Therefore, (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z(tk, z).
The upper semicontinuity of the function Z(tk, ·) follows from (39), the upper semi-
continuity of the multivalued function W k, and the lower semicontinuity of the function
̺ik(z).
Now let us show that the function Z satisfies condition 1–4 of the theorem.
Note that conditions 1 and 4 are fulfilled by the construction. Prove conditions 2 and 3.
Let (t∗, ξ∗) ∈ ∆
N ×Rn, t+ ∈ ∆
N , t+ > t, u∗ ∈ P , (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z(t∗, ξ∗). It suffices to consider
the case t = tk, t+ = tk+1. By construction of the function Z we have that Y1 ≥ ̺
1
k(ξ∗).
From the definition of the function ̺1k (see (35)) it follows that
Y1 ≥ max
u∈P
min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, ξ∗, u, v)) ≥ min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, ξ∗, u∗, v)).
Let v∗ ∈ Q be a control of player II such that
min
v∈Q
ς1k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, ξ∗, u∗, v)) = ς
1
k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, ξ∗, u∗, v∗)).
From the definition of the function ς1k+1 we get that there exists a pair (Y
′
1 , Y
′
2) ∈
Z(tk+1, ξ(tk+1, tk, ξ∗, u∗, v∗)) such that Y
′
1 = ς
1
k+1(ξ(tk+1, tk, ξ∗, u∗, v∗)). Consequently, Y1 ≥
Y ′1 . Hence, condition 2 holds. Condition 3 is proved analogously.
5.2 Continuous Time Dynamics
Theorem 5.2. There exists an upper semicontinuous multivalued function S : [0, T ]×Rn ⇒
R
2 with nonempty images satisfying conditions (S1)–(S4).
The proof of Theorem 5.2 is given in the end of the section.
First, for each N define the multivalued function SN : [0, T ]×Rn ⇒ R2 by the following
rule:
SN(t, x) :=

ZN(tNk , x), t ∈ (tk−1, tk), k = 1, N − 1
ZN(tk, x) ∪ Z
N(tk+1, x), t = tk, k = 0, N − 1
ZN(tNN , x), t = T
(40)
The functions SN have the closed graph.
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Denote
B(ν) := {x : ‖x‖ ≤ ν}.
For Σ : [0, T ]× Rn ⇒ R2 set
GrνΣ := {(t, x, Y1, Y2) : ‖x‖ ≤ ν, (Y1, Y2) ∈ Σ(t, x)}.
The sets GrνS
N are compacts. Indeed,
Mi,ν := max{|σi(x(T, t∗, x∗, u, v))| : t∗ ∈ [0, T ], ‖x∗‖ ≤ ν, u ∈ U , v ∈ V} <∞.
We have that GrνSN ⊂ [0, T ]× B(ν)× [−M1,ν ,M1,ν ]× [−M2,ν ,M2,ν ].
Consider the Hausdorff distance between compact sets A,B ⊂ [0, T ]× Rn × R2
h(A,B)
:= max
{
max
(t,x,Y1,Y2)∈A
d((t, x, Y1, Y2), B), max
(t,x,Y1,Y2)∈B
d((t, x, Y1, Y2), A)
}
.
Here d((t, x, Y1, Y2), A) is the distance from the point (t, x, Y1, Y2) to the set A generated
by the norm
‖(t, x, Y1, Y2)‖ = |t|+ ‖x‖+ |Y1|+ |Y2|.
Since for any ν the set [0, T ] × B(ν + 1) × [−M1,ν ,M1,ν ] × [−M2,ν ,M2,ν ] is compact,
using [18, Theorem 4.18] we get that one can extract a convergent subsequence from the
sequence {Grν+1S
N}∞N=1.
Using the diagonal process we construct the subsequence {Nj} such that for any ν there
exists the limit
lim
j→∞
Grν+1S
Nj = Rν .
One can choose the subsequence {Nj} satisfying the property:
h(Grν+1S
Nj , Rν) ≤ 2
−j for j ≥ ν.
Denote S˜j := S
Nj .
Lemma 5.2. Let (Y1,l, Y2,l) ∈ S˜jl(tl, xl), ‖xl‖ ≤ ν + 1, (tl, xl) → (t
∗, x∗), (Y1,l, Y1,l) →
(Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 ), as l →∞. Then (t
∗, x∗, Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 ) ∈ Rν.
Proof. Consider the set Rν ∪ {(t
∗, x∗, Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 )}. This set is closed. We claim that
h(Grν+1S˜jl, Rν ∪ {(t
∗, x∗, Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 )})→ 0, l →∞. (41)
Indeed, d((t, x, Y1, Y2), Rν ∪ {(t
∗, x∗, Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 )}) ≤ d((t, x, Y1, Y2), Rν) for all (t, x, Y1, Y2) ≤
Grν+1S˜jl. Hence
max
(t,x,Y1,Y2)∈Grν+1S˜jl
d((t, x, Y1, Y2), Rν ∪ {(t
∗, x∗, Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 )})→ 0, as l →∞. (42)
Further, the following convergence is valid:
max
(t,x,Y1,Y2)∈Rν∪{(t∗,x∗,Y ∗1 ,Y
∗
2
)}
{d((t, x, Y1, Y2),Grν+1S˜jl)} → 0, as l →∞.
This and (42) yield (41).
Formula (41) means that
Rν ∪ {(t
∗, x∗, Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 )} = lim
l→∞
Grν+1S˜jl = Rν .
This completes the proof.
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Lemma 5.3. For r > ν the following equality holds:
Rr ∩ ([0, T ]×B(ν)× R
2) = Rν ∩ ([0, T ]×B(ν)× R
2).
Proof. Let (t, x, Y1, Y2) ∈ Rr, ‖x‖ ≤ ν, and j ≥ r. There exists a quadruple
(θj , yj, ζ1,j, ζ2,j) ∈ Grr+1S˜j such that
|t− θj |+ ‖x− yj‖+ |Y1 − ζ1,j|+ |Y2 − ζ2,j| = d((t, x, Y1, Y2),Grr+1S˜j) ≤ 2
−j. (43)
Therefore, ‖x − yj‖ ≤ d((t, x, Y1, Y2),Grr+1S˜j) ≤ 2
−j. We have that ‖yj‖ ≤ ‖x‖ + 2
−j ≤
ν + 1. Therefore, (θj , yj, ζ1,j, ζ2,j) ∈ Grν+1S˜j. It follows from formula (43) and lemma 5.2
that (t, x, Y1, Y2) ∈ Rν . Since the quadrable (t, x, Y1, Y2) satisfies the condition ‖x‖ ≤ ν we
conclude that
Rr ∩ ([t0, T ]×B(ν)× R
2) ⊂ Rν ∩ ([t0, T ]× B(ν)× R
2).
The opposite inclusion is proved in the same way.
Define the multivalued function S¯ : [0, T ]×Rn ⇒ R2 by the following rule: for ‖x‖ ≤ ν
S¯(t, x) := {(Y1, Y2) : (t, x, Y1, Y2) ∈ Rν}.
Note that this definition is correct by virtue of lemma 5.3. We have that GrνS¯ = Rν ∩
([t0, T ]×B(ν)× R
2).
Proof of theorem 5.2 We shall show that the function S¯ has nonempty images, and satisfies
conditions (S1)–(S4).
First we shall prove that the sets S¯(t, x) are nonempty. Let ν satisfy the condition
‖x‖ < ν, and let (Y1,j, Y2,j) ∈ S˜j(t, x). Since S˜j(t, x) ⊂ [−M1,ν ,M1,ν ]× [−M2,ν ,M2,ν ], there
exists a subsequence {(Y1,jl, Y2,jl)}
∞
l=1 converging to a pair (Y
∗
1 , Y
∗
2 ). By lemma 5.2 we obtain
that (Y ∗1 , Y
∗
2 ) ∈ S¯(t, x).
Now let us prove that the multivalued function S¯ satisfies conditions (S1)–(S4).
We begin with condition (S1). Let x∗ ∈ R
n. Choose ν such that the following conditions
hold
1. x(t, T, x∗, u, v) ∈ B(ν) for all t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U , v ∈ V;
2. all z such that x∗ = ξ
N(T, t, z, u, v) for some natural N , t ∈ ∆N , u ∈ UN , v ∈ VN
belong to B(ν).
Let Kν be defined by (3) for E = B(ν + 1).
Let N be a natural number, t∗ ∈ ∆
N , and ξ∗ ∈ B(ν). By conditions 1 and 4 of Theorem
5.1 we have that if (Y1, Y2) ∈ Z
N(t∗, ξ∗), then there exist u ∈ U
N , and v ∈ VN such that
Yi = σi(ξ
N(T, t∗, ξ∗, u, v)), i = 1, 2. (44)
We have the estimate
‖ξ∗ − ξ
N(T, t∗, ξ∗, u, v)‖ ≤ Kν(T − t∗). (45)
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Let (J1, J2) ∈ S¯(T, x). This means that there exists a sequence {(tj, xj , Y1,j, Y2,j)}
∞
j=1
such that (Y1,j, Y2,j) ∈ S˜j(tj , xj) = S
Nj(tj , xj), and tj → T , xj → x, Yi,j → Ji as j →∞. Let
θj ∈ ∆
Nj be such that (Y1,j, Y2,j) ∈ Z
Nj (θj , xj) and tj ∈ (θj − δ
N , θj ]. Combining this, (44),
and (45) we conclude that for any j there exists x′j ∈ B(ν) such that ‖xj−x
′
j‖ ≤ Kν(T −tj)
and Yi,j = σi(x
′
j), i = 1, 2. We have that x
′
j → x, as j → ∞. By the continuity of the
functions σi we obtain that
Ji = lim
l→∞
Yi,j = lim
j→∞
σi(x
′
j) = σi(x).
Now we shall prove the fulfillment of condition (S2). Let (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]×R
n, (J1, J2) ∈
S¯(t∗, x∗), u ∈ P , t+ ∈ [t∗, T ]. We shall show that there exists y
2(·) ∈ Sol2(t∗, x∗, u) such
that J ′1 ≤ J1 for some (J
′
1, J
′
2) ∈ S¯(t+, y
2(t+)).
There exists a sequence {(tj , xj, Y1,j, Y2,j)}
∞
j=1 such that (Y1,j, Y2,j) ∈ S˜j(tj , xj) =
SNj (tj , xj), and tj → t∗, xj → x∗, Yi,j → Ji, as j → ∞. Let θj be an element of ∆
Nj
such that (Y1,j, Y2,j) ∈ Z
Nj (θj , xj) and tj ∈ (θj−δ
N , θj ]. Further, let τj be the least element
of ∆Nj such that t+ ≤ τj .
By condition 2 of Theorem 5.1 for each j there exist a control vj ∈ V
Nj , and a pair
(Y ′1,j, Y
′
2,j) such that (Y
′
1,j, Y
′
2,j) ∈ Z
Nj (τj , ξ
Nj(τj , θj, xj , u, vj)) ⊂ S˜
j(τj, ξ
Nj(τj , θj , xj, u, vj))
and Y ′1,j ≤ Y1,j. By lemma 5.1 we have that
‖x(τj , θj , xj, u, vj)− ξ
Nj(τj, θj , xj , u, vj)‖ ≤ ϕ
′(δNj ) exp(LT ).
We may extract a subsequence {jl}
∞
l=1 such that {x(·, θjl, xjl, u, vjl)}
∞
l=1 converges to some
motion y2(·), and {(Y ′1,jl, Y
′
2,jl
)} converges to some pair (J ′1, J
′
2). We have that y
2(·) ∈
Sol2(t∗, x∗, u). Lemma 5.2 gives the inclusion (J
′
1, J
′
2) ∈ S(t+, y
2(t+)). We also have
J ′1 ≤ J1.
This completes the proof of condition (S2).
Conditions (S3) and (S4) are proved analogously.
6 Conclusion
In this paper the Nash equilibria for differential games in the class of control with guide
strategies are constructed on the basis of an upper semicontinuous multivalued function
satisfying boundary condition and some viability conditions. The main result is that for
any compact of initial positions and any selector of the multivalued map it is possible to
construct a Nash equilibrium such that the corresponding players’ payoff is equal to the
value of the given selector. The existence of the multivalued function satisfying proposed
conditions is also proved. If the upper semicontinuous multivalued function is replaced with
a continuous function, then the construction of the strategies is simplified. However, in the
general case the desired continuous function doesn’t exist.
Only two players nonzero-sum differential games with terminal payoffs and compact
control spaces were considered. The results can be extended to the games with payoffs
equal to the sum of terminal and running parts by introducing new variables describing
running payoffs. Note that if the running payoff of each player doesn’t depend on the
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control of the another one, then the players need only the information about the state
variable to construct the Nash equilibrium control with guide strategies. The condition of
compactness of control spaces is essential, and the methods developed in the paper can’t be
used for the games with unbounded control spaces. (Such games were studied by Bressan
and Shen in [6], [7] on the basis of BV solutions of PDEs.)
Future work includes the extension of the obtained results to the game with many
players and the stability analysis of proposed conditions.
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